Across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), reformist parties often rise as a result of civic anger, mobilizing against corruption, captured states, and opportunistic elites. However, only a few survive the difficult transition from opposition movements to governing forces (Tavits, 2005; Rupnik & Zielonka, 2013). Their emergence is usually rapid and dramatic: a mix of urban professionals, activists, and disillusioned citizens getting together to attempt political reconstruction. While civic energy can provide a good basis for political opposition, sustaining power requires more than collective outrage. The transition from opposition to governance proves to be a critical point and not many have succeeded in transforming themselves from protest movements into disciplined organizations capable of governing and negotiating durable coalitions.

 
The case of Moldova’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) is striking precisely because it defies this pattern. In the September 2025 parliamentary elections, PAS secured 50.03% of the vote and 55 seats, a majority under Moldova’s proportional system. This outcome consolidates a trajectory that began with Maia Sandu’s 2020 presidential victory and PAS’s decisive 2021 win. Unlike most reformist projects in the region, PAS has not faded after a single electoral breakthrough. Instead, it has matured into the country’s central governing force, building legitimacy through repeated successes and a consistent reformist vision. Romania’s Save Romania Union (USR), by contrast, illustrates the more typical trajectory: rapid rise, initial promise, but eventual fragmentation and decline. Like PAS, it was born from civic activism and anti-corruption protests. Unlike PAS, it struggled to transform itself into a stable governing force.

What makes PAS remarkable is not only its pro-European stance, but also the way it transformed from an issue-driven opposition party into a credible, stable government (Muntean, 2023). It has presented itself as the party who will achieve modernization, European integration, and good governance. Its strength lies in its clarity of vision, aligning Moldova with the EU, promoting institutional reform, and anchoring the country in a pro-Western geopolitical narrative.

 
This article explores how PAS achieved this consolidation and contrasts it with Romania’s Save Romania Union (USR). It examines how the two parties framed their missions, the role of their leadership, the impact of electoral and party systems, and the importance of institutional patience. The analysis then situates PAS within broader regional patterns before drawing lessons for new reformist movements across CEE.

OPPOSITION AND ISSUE FRAMING
PAS’s foundations were built on clear enemies: corruption at home and Russian influence abroad. These positions gave the party moral clarity, making it the voice of integrity in a political landscape long dominated by oligarchic interests, shifting allegiances, and disillusioned citizens (Rusu, 2022; Minzarari, 2021). This clarity of purpose mattered in Moldova’s highly volatile environment, where party loyalty has traditionally been shallow and clientelist, and where the political system has often been captured by political figures like Vladimir Plahotniuc. The 2014 banking scandal, when $1.3 billion vanished from Moldova’s financial system, symbolized the depth of elite capture and provided PAS with a powerful moral platform. PAS’s stance against both domestic corruption and external interference distinguished it from previous reformist attempts, which were often quickly absorbed or neutralized by opportunistic elites.

USR in Romania was born from a similar civic energy, mobilizing urban activists and professionals around anti-corruption and political renewal. Its emergence reflected the wave of protests after the 2015 Colectiv nightclub fire and subsequent mass mobilizations against PSD’s attempts to weaken the anti-corruption framework (Soare & Bodea, 2021). Like PAS, USR channeled frustration with a corrupt political class. However, while PAS successfully transitioned from slogans to governance, USR remained stuck in protest mode, unable to develop its mission into a durable governing framework.

The crucial difference lies in their adopted narrative. PAS embedded its mission within a national survival narrative: Europe versus Russia, reform versus oligarchy. This existential framing turned the party’s project into a matter of national sovereignty and collective destiny, enabling it to mobilize across Moldova’s urban-rural divide and consolidate a broad constituency for modernization. PAS effectively framed governance reform not just as a policy choice, but as the only path to ensure Moldova’s independence and future.

 
USR, by contrast, struggled to move beyond an urban, technocratic discourse. Its messaging resonated strongly with younger, educated middle classes in cities like Bucharest, Cluj, and Timișoara, who were frustrated with PSD’s dominance and Romania’s slow institutional reforms (Gherghina & Volintiru, 2019). Yet the party failed to craft a narrative that could connect with rural or working-class voters, who continued to rely on PSD’s redistributive promises and PNL’s more conservative appeals. In this sense, USR’s project was socially and geographically narrow, and its lack of a national destiny frame limited its ability to consolidate beyond its protest identity.

Disinformation and diaspora dynamics further shaped the path of both parties. In Moldova, Russian-backed propaganda has long targeted PAS and Maia Sandu, branding them as “foreign agents” or “anti-traditional,” aiming to erode trust. Yet PAS turned these attacks to its advantage by framing reform as a battle for Moldova’s survival against corruption and external interference. The Moldovan diaspora, consistently supporting PAS, amplified this message and played a decisive role in electoral victories, providing a stable counterweight to domestic disinformation. In Romania, USR also began with strong diaspora support, particularly in 2016 and 2019. But in recent elections, much of this base shifted towards AUR, drawn by nationalist and conspiratorial appeals. While USR has regained a small part of that vote, the episode revealed its fragility.

 
This divergence highlights a broader lesson about reformist parties in CEE: issue-based clarity provides a strong basis and entry point, but perhaps only those movements that successfully embed themselves in existential national narratives can transition into governing parties with broader legitimacy.

LEADERSHIP: COHESION VS FRAGMENTATION
PAS benefitted from the unifying figure of Maia Sandu. Trained at Harvard and with experience at the World Bank, Sandu brought technocratic expertise and international credibility into a Moldovan political system long dominated by oligarchic capture (Muntean, 2023). Her reputation for personal integrity set her apart from the political establishment, allowing her to function as a symbol of good governance in a country marked by high corruption scandals. Her election as President reinforced PAS’s legitimacy, creating a relationship between leader and party: the party amplified her credibility, while she, in turn, embodied and anchored the party’s reformist identity. This mutual reinforcement prevented the fragmentation that has historically affected reformist parties in the region (Rusu, 2022).

By contrast, USR in Romania became a case study in leadership instability. Founder Nicușor Dan, current President of Romania, built his reputation as a civic activist through urban policy campaigns and grassroots mobilization, eventually becoming mayor of Bucharest in 2020. Yet his victory was more a product of his personal credibility than the party’s organizational strength, leaving USR unable to claim ownership of his success. Once Dan departed from the party’s helm, leadership oscillated among Dan Barna, Dacian Cioloș, and later Cătălin Drulă, each representing different factions, visions, and internal rivalries (Ioniță, 2022). Instead of cohesion, USR projected volatility and disunity, often making headlines for internal disputes rather than policy achievements (Soare & Bodea, 2021).

 
The contrast highlights an important dynamic in party development across CEE. Reformist movements often cconsolidate around charismatic or symbolic figures, but the nature of the leader–party relationship determines their durability. In PAS’s case, Sandu became a unifying pole whose integrity and international recognition allowed the party to transcend Moldova’s traditional elite rivalries. In USR’s case, leaders became centrifugal forces, pulling the party into multiple directions rather than consolidating it. The lack of a single, legitimizing figure created an image of instability that alienated both voters and potential allies.

This divergence reveals why PAS succeeded where USR failed: a reformist leader embedded within a disciplined party can create institutional legitimacy, while leaders detached from their parties, or competing with them, generate fragmentation and decline.

ELECTORAL AND PARTY SYSTEM
Moldova’s electoral system, a single nationwide constituency with proportional representation, structurally favors coherent, centralized parties. Because every vote is aggregated into a national pool, the system punishes fragmentation and rewards disciplined organizations (Rusu, 2022). PAS benefitted enormously from this design: its simple narrative translated directly into parliamentary seats. Competing smaller parties, by contrast, found it far harder to pass the 5% threshold.

Romania’s system, while also proportional, is fragmented across 41 county constituencies plus a separate diaspora seat allocation. This creates strong incentives for parties to develop territorially embedded networks, particularly at the county and municipal level. As a result, established parties such as PSD and PNL maintain enduring dominance through their clientelistic structures, control of local politics, and mobilization capacity in rural areas. USR, despite achieving impressive results in major cities and among diaspora communities, was structurally disadvantaged by its lack of rural penetration and local infrastructure (Soare & Bodea, 2021). Its electoral geography was narrow, concentrated in urban areas rather than spread across the national territory.

The contrast is also reflected in the broader party system context. Politics in Moldova are historically more volatile. Parties rise and collapse quickly, often centered on oligarchic figures whose influence depends on access to financial and media resources. The erosion of these oligarchic forces after 2019, most notably with the fall of Vladimir Plahotniuc, created political space for PAS to emerge as the dominant pole, consolidating a new, reformist movement in Moldovan politics (Minzarari, 2021).

Romania’s party system, by contrast, is far more institutionalized and entrenched. PSD and PNL, heirs to post-communist party development, control extensive patronage networks that extend into every local structure. Their resilience stems not only from ideology but from organizational capture of the state apparatus at the county and municipal level. Scholars describe this dynamic as a form of “state capture through party machines” (Grzymala-Busse, 2007). For a newcomer like USR, this meant facing structural barriers far beyond electoral competition: without clientelist leverage, long-term territorial and administrative presence, it struggled to scale from an urban protest movement into a national governing force.

 
INSTITUTIONAL PATIENCE
PAS’s trajectory demonstrates the importance of institutional patience in the evolution of reformist parties. For about five years, PAS remained in opposition, a position it used strategically rather than resentfully. During this period, the party invested heavily in recruiting reform-minded professionals, economists, lawyers, civic activists, who could provide technical expertise and credibility (Muntean, 2023). Opposition also allowed PAS to cultivate internal discipline, refine its policy agenda, and build a reputation for integrity without being immediately exposed to the compromises and pressures of governance. By the time it entered power, PAS had developed a cadre of politicians and technocrats able to translate slogans into policy. This deliberate gestation period gave the party resilience once in office.

Political science research stresses the value of such gradual development. Tavits (2005) argues that party institutionalization, the process of forming stable organizational structures, identities, and loyalties, is critical to electoral durability and success in post-communist systems. Parties that invest in organization and policy coherence in opposition are more likely to build stable voter bases and survive the volatility of young democracies. PAS exemplifies this model: it used time in opposition to consolidate rather than fragment, and to build the perception of reliability and professionalism.

USR followed a different path as its primary strategic objective was to enter government as quickly as possible, a reflection of both internal ambition and the impatience of its activist base. The party’s rapid ascent, moving from street protests into ministerial portfolios, exposed its lack of political experience and organizational maturity (Gherghina, 2020). Many of its figures, while competent professionals, were inexperienced in the mechanics of coalition governance, public administration, and political compromise. As a result, several USR ministers appeared isolated or overwhelmed when in office, and the party’s brand suffered from the perception of amateurism.

The cost of premature governing was high. Rather than consolidating as a single reformist pole, USR fragmented: first into PLUS, through its merger and later separation with Dacian Cioloș’s movement, and later into REPER after further defections (Ioniță, 2022). Each split diluted the party’s identity, leaving it weaker both organizationally and electorally. What was once a promising vehicle for anti-corruption reform instead became associated with instability and burnout. To many observers, it even seemed as if the constant reshuffling was less a strategy of growth than a move to destabilize opposition forces.

 
The contrast highlights a broader lesson for reformist parties in CEE: opposition can be an asset if used to consolidate capacity, while rushing into governance without organizational foundations can accelerate fragmentation. PAS demonstrates that patience, discipline, and careful recruitment prepare a party for sustainable power. USR illustrates the dangers of mistaking electoral momentum for institutional readiness to govern.

 
COMPARATIVE REGIONAL PATTERNS
PAS’s success is exceptional in a region where many reformist parties have followed USR’s trajectory. Slovakia’s OĽaNO surged in 2020 on an anti-corruption wave but fragmented once in power. Poland’s Nowoczesna won urban professionals before rapidly fading. The Czech Republic’s ANO, by contrast, survived by transforming into a populist leader-centric party under Andrej Babiš, sacrificing reformist narratives for electoral dominance. Bulgaria offers another cautionary tale, where successive reformist movements were repeatedly co-opted into unstable coalitions, eroding their credibility.

These cases illustrate recurring patterns across CEE. Some parties become fragmented, as rival leaders pull in different directions. Others drift into populism, abandoning reform in favor of short wins. A number are co-opted by established elites, absorbed into clientelist bargains they once opposed. Many experience the one-cycle breakthrough, enjoying a surge of protest votes before collapsing due to unfulfilled electoral expectations. PAS stands out precisely because it avoided these traps. By institutionalizing patiently in opposition, cultivating disciplined organization, and anchoring its identity in an existential narrative of sovereignty, anti-corruption, and European integration, it has broken the cycle of volatility that defines reformist politics in the region.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The comparison between PAS and USR highlights how reformist movements succeed or fail based on a combination of leadership, institutional settings, and cultural narratives.Moldova’s PAS has demonstrated that reformist parties can evolve from opposition fighters into credible governing forces. Its trajectory illustrates what Tavits (2005) calls the institutionalization of party competition, and what Enyedi (2017) describes as the capacity of new parties to transcend volatility through coherence and discipline. Romania’s USR, by contrast, exemplifies the pattern identified in the literature on short-lived anti-establishment parties: rapid ascent, overextension, and decline (Gherghina, 2020; Soare & Bodea, 2021).

The lesson for reformist movements across CEE is clear: moral clarity may open the door, but only organizational discipline, broad national and local reach, and strategic patience can keep it open. The challenge is not winning an election but consolidating legitimacy over time, embedding reformist parties within the political system without succumbing to fragmentation.

PAS is therefore not just a Moldovan story but a regional case study of reformist success. In a region where new parties often burn bright and fade quickly, PAS has shown that with unifying leadership, a disciplined organization, and an existential narrative, reformist movements can become governing institutions. For others, whether in Romania, Slovakia, or Poland, the question remains whether they can learn from this example, or whether they will repeat the cycle of volatility, fragmentation, and decline.

1. Invest in organization, not just mobilization: Protests and civic movements can bring a party into politics, but they are not enough to sustain it. Long-term success depends on building disciplined party structures, local branches, and networks that reach beyond the main cities.

 
2. Anchor reform in broader narratives: Reform gains traction when it is framed as part of the nation’s future and survival, not just as a technical fix. Linking governance to sovereignty, dignity, and fairness helps reformist parties connect with wider groups, not only urban professionals.

3. Cultivate stable leadership: A respected, consistent leader who grows with the party gives credibility and stability. Constant changes at the top weaken internal trust and make the party look unreliable to voters.

4. Use time in opposition as preparation: Opposition should be a period to professionalize: training activists, recruiting talent, and developing concrete policies. If this time is wasted on short-term deals or quarrels, the party enters government unprepared and burns out quickly.

5. Long-term ideological clarity: Reformist parties should resist being absorbed by old elites or chasing populist trends. Staying clear about values and priorities builds long-term trust, even if it means slower short-term growth.

For reformist parties elsewhere, the lesson is clear: energy and moral clarity can launch a movement, but only discipline, patience, and broad-based narratives can keep it alive.